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Abstract  
Despite the ethnicisation of power since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has managed to 
maintain political stability without experiencing large-scale mobilisation to oppose Kazakh 
domination. This paper examines government strategy to avoid ethnic voting in an attempt to 
explain why ethnic divisions were rarely reflected in the struggle for power in the republic. 
While the arbitrary use of legal provisions considerably limited participation in elections by 
ethnic leaders, powerful pro-president parties that exhibited a cross-ethnic character were created 
to curtail ethnically based movements. The control strategy in elections aimed not simply at 
ethnicising the parliament in favour of Kazakhs, but at having loyal Russians and other 
minorities represented in the legislature through nomination by the president and catch-all 
pro-regime parties, or through the presidential consultative body—Assembly of the People of 
Kazakhstan. This well-controlled representation of minorities served not only to placate 
non-Kazakhs but also to provide legitimacy for the Kazakh-dominated leadership by projecting 
the image of cross-ethnic support for the president and some degree of power-sharing. 
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Introduction 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ruling elites in Kazakhstan, as 
in other non-Russian republics, started the ethnicisation of political power.1 This was 
the most effective means by which to overcome the imperial legacy of the Soviet Union 
and to show who owned the newly independent state. In Kazakhstan, the greatest risk of 
Kazakh monopoly or predominance in state organs was considered to be the opposition 
of ethnic Russians, who, at the time of independence, numerically competed with 
Kazakhs. It was often assumed that Russians were unlikely to reconcile themselves to 
minority status in independent Kazakhstan, and that an ethnic Russian rebellion against 
the government would invite potentially disastrous interference from neighbouring 
Russia. In fact, Kazakhstan has experienced little ethnic conflict since independence. 
Indeed, in the early 1990s Russians challenged government policies regarding the status 
of the Russian language and dual citizenship with the Russian Federation. Since the 
mid-1990s, however, ethnic issues have rarely been raised in public, not to mention 
Russian separatist demands.  
 Why has Kazakhstan managed to maintain political stability without 
experiencing large-scale mobilisation to oppose Kazakh domination? While this puzzle 
has been explored from different aspects, such as political weakness of ethnic identity2 
and manipulation of mass psychology,3 this paper deals with Kazakhstani government 
strategy focusing on co-optation of the non-Kazakh elite to explain why ethnic divisions 
are rarely reflected in the struggle for power sharing. To that end, this paper analyses 
elections, in which the co-optation strategy of Kazakhstan’s power elite is most 
explicitly revealed, and examines the ways in which ethnic voting has been prevented 
under Nazarbaev’s authoritarian regime. But before doing so, post-independent 
                                                  
1 There are several empirically grounded accounts on this point. See, for instance, Cummings 
(2005: 69-72). 
2 On the weak and diffused identity within the Russian community, see Melvin (1998; 1995). 
For Luong (2002), what depoliticised ethnic division was regionalism, which served as a 
mechanism to resolve conflict in a peaceful manner.  
3 Building on the concept of cultural framing, Schatz (2000) contends that a discursive frame 
deployed by Kazakhstan’s power elite, which he calls ‘internationalism with an ethnic face,’ 
served to avoid mobilisation along ethnic lines by glossing over contradictory practices of 
ethnicisation and civic nation-building.  
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developments of the parliamentary system are demonstrated below, with reference to the 
process of concentration of power in the hands of incumbent President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev. 
 
1 Parliamentary System of Independent Kazakhstan 
If asked to evaluate Kazakhstan by democratic standards, few would argue that this 
country should receive a failing mark. Despite the formal introduction of democratic 
institutions after independence, developments in Kazakhstan politics have increasingly 
revealed the nondemocratic character of this regime. Based on the definition by Juan 
Linz (1970), who first conceptualised the authoritarian system of government, Uyama 
(1996) argues that Kazakhstan’s political regime immediately following the Soviet 
collapse could be categorised as ‘semi-democratic authoritarianism,’ but after the spring 
of 1995, it became a typical authoritarian regime.4 Cummings (2005: 22-29) also sees 
1995 as a watershed year, when initial liberalisation came to an end and consolidation of 
power by the president began. While Nazarbaev repeatedly referred to democratic 
reforms and advocated strengthening the role of parliament and political parties, the 
retreat from democratisation proceeded unabated.  
In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, universal suffrage is guaranteed but none of the 
presidential or parliamentary elections can be considered fair or free.5 There has been 
no regime change; Nazarbaev was elected president without alternative candidates or by 
winning an overwhelming victory (eighty to ninety percent of the votes cast), and his 
term has been repeatedly extended by referendum and constitutional amendments. 
Despite the formal introduction of a plural party system, the parliament has been 
                                                  
4 See also Uyama (2004) for his detailed analysis on political regimes in Central Asian states. 
The Freedom House annually publishes a survey on global political rights and civil liberties, 
assessing both in each country on a seven grade scale (a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree 
of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom). Each pair of political rights and civil liberties 
ratings is averaged to determine an overall status. Those whose ratings average 1.0-2.5 are 
classified as ‘free,’ 3.0 to 5.0 ‘partly free,’ and 5.5 to 7.0 ‘not free.’ Kazakhstan was rated as 
‘partly free’ from 1991 through 1993, but since 1994 its ranking has been downgraded to ‘not 
free,’ with political rights rating 6 and civil liberties 5. See ‘Freedom in the World Comparative 
and Historical Data,’ available at http://freedomhouse.org [accessed in March 2009].   
5 For example, see OSCE/ODIHR election reports (OSCE/ODIHR: 2004, 2006, 2007). 
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increasingly dominated by pro-president parties, whose programmes differ little from 
one another. Since the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in March 1995, the opposition 
has been virtually excluded from the legislature. Officially guaranteed freedom of 
assembly is practically restricted, as the Ministry of Justice, with which political parties 
and associations are obliged to be registered, often refuses or annuls the registration of 
oppositional organisations. Although the involvement of the authorities is not always 
clear, there have been a number of cases in which opposition politicians and journalists 
were physically attacked, or even assassinated.6 Freedom of speech is also limited. 
Soon after independence, critical comments addressed to the government or even 
president could often be found in the mass media. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, 
relatives of the president began to gain control over major TV, radio, and newspaper 
companies. A provision on the inviolability of honour and dignity of the president 
(Article 46.1) of the 1995 Constitution has often been ill-used to pressure the mass 
media and oppositional figures. 
 Nursultan Nazarbaev, the first (and so far only) president of independent 
Kazakhstan, was appointed to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan in June 1989. In April 1990, he was elected the republic’s first president by 
the Supreme Soviet. On 1 December 1991, Nazarbaev was again elected president, this 
time directly by the citizens of Kazakhstan. This was shortly before Kazakhstan’s 
Supreme Soviet adopted a Law on Independence on 16 December 1991. In the early 
1990s, Nazarbaev was known as a progressively-minded, reformist leader who allowed 
active debate in parliament and the expression of a variety of opinions in the mass 
media. This was in stark contrast to Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbours such as 
Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, both of which cracked down on opposition and suppressed 
freedom of the press soon after independence.  
 The early post-Soviet indications of liberalisation, however, soon paved the 
                                                  
6 The most well-known politicians who were killed or died in highly suspicious circumstances 
are Zamanbek Nurkadilov and Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly (Sarsenbaev). Nurkadilov, former mayor 
of Almaty and governor of Almaty oblast, was found dead in November 2005. Sarsenbaiuly had 
held several ministerial and ambassadorial posts before he joined Nagyz Ak Zhol in 2003. He 
was one of Nagyz Ak Zhol's co-chairmen at the time of his death in February 2006.  
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way for a concentration of power in the hands of President Nazarbaev. Within a three 
and a half year period following independence, Kazakhstan’s parliament was dissolved 
twice in a rather irregular manner, events which most likely reflected the intentions of 
the president. In December 1993, the twelfth Supreme Soviet, which had been elected in 
Soviet times (April 1990) declared ‘self-dissolution’, delegating its full power to the 
president. The thirteenth Supreme Soviet was elected soon thereafter, in March 1994, 
with its seats reduced by half. The first parliamentary elections in independent 
Kazakhstan had a specific feature that both the opposition and the then Conference for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) criticised as undemocratic: out of one 
hundred and seventy seven seats, forty two were to be elected from a state list 
(gosspisok) that consisted of sixty four candidates nominated by President Nazarbaev. In 
March 1995, the thirteenth Supreme Soviet was again dissolved by a decision of the 
Constitutional Court that ruled the elections of the previous year unconstitutional.7 As a 
result, parliamentary power was again delegated to the president.  
 Nazarbaev effectively used this parliamentary hiatus to strengthen his power. In 
March 1995, the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK), a presidential 
consultative body that had been established less than a month before, proposed a 
referendum on extending the president’s term to December 2000. The referendum was 
held in April 1995 and was approved by an overwhelming majority. In August of the 
same year, another referendum was called to adopt a new constitution, which again was 
supported by an absolute majority. The 1995 Constitution made Kazakhstan a 
presidential republic, vesting the president with broad authority. It also replaced the 
Soviet-style Supreme Soviet with a two-chamber four-year-term parliament. The 
Mazhilis, or the lower house, had sixty seven seats elected in single-member districts, 
and most members of the Senat, or upper house, were indirectly elected by maslikhats 
(oblast or provincial parliaments) while seven seats were directly nominated by the 
president. (For the parliamentary system of Kazakhstan and its changes since 1995, see 
Table 1.) The new parliament was elected in December 1995 without meaningful 
                                                  
7 The Constitutional Court considered an appeal from a parliamentary candidate who lost the 
1994 election. For more details, see Uyama (1996), and Dixon (1996: 97-103). 
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participation by the opposition.  
 Following Nazarbaev’s annual message to the people of Kazakhstan in 
September 1998, in which he advocated political and economic reforms in the new 
millennium, the parliament adopted constitutional amendments in October 1998. These 
resulted in extending parliamentary terms (the Senat to six years and the Mazhilis to 
five years), and the partial introduction of proportional representation in the Mazhilis 
(ten seats were added to be elected in a nationwide district under a proportional 
representation system). In return, parliamentary members took decisions favouring the 
incumbent president: the presidential tenure was extended from five to seven years; the 
date for presidential elections was advanced to January 1999 from December 2000; 
changes were made to the age limits for candidates by eliminating the upper limit of 
sixty five years and raising the lower limit from thirty five to forty. This last amendment 
appears to have been made considering the age of Nazarbaev, who was born in 1940.  
 The January 1999 presidential elections, contested for the first time by more 
than one candidate, resulted in a landslide victory for Nazarbaev.8 As a result of the 
following Mazhilis elections in October 1999, the seats were distributed among 
pro-president parties such as Otan (‘Fatherland’ in Kazakh)9 and the Civic Party 
(Grazhdanskaia partiia),10 and non-partisans who support the president. From the 
opposition, only the Communist Party won representation—three seats. The opposition 
was even less successful in the 2004 September-October Mazhilis elections: The Ak 
Zhol (‘Bright Path’ in Kazakh) Party received only one seat,11 while all remaining seats 
                                                  
8 The ex-premier Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who was viewed as the main competition to the 
incumbent, was denied registration as a candidate for a trivial violation of the electoral law. 
Kazhegeldin was prosecuted for attending a meeting that was organised by an unsanctioned 
movement, For Fair Elections, in October 1998. The Constitutional Law on Elections prohibited 
registration as a presidential candidate for a person who received an administrative penalty 
within one year prior to registration (Article 4.4). 
9 On Otan Party, see section 2.  
10 The Civic Party was founded in November 1998 and claimed to represent the interests of the 
industrial sector. Its leader Azat Peruashev was Deputy General Director of Aluminium of 
Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan’s largest producer of aluminium. 
11 After the 2004 Mazhilis elections, Ak Zhol gave up its seat in protest against unfair elections. 
In February 2005 its leadership split into two separate parties, namely Ak Zhol and Nagyz (‘true’ 
in Kazakh) Ak Zhol, both of which claimed to be the party’s legitimate successor. In February 
2006, the leadership of Ak Zhol changed its previous position and its leader Alikhan Baimenov 
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were distributed among pro-regime Otan, AIST (an election bloc consisting of the Civic 
Party and Agrarian Party12), Asar (‘Mutual Help’ in Kazakh) headed by Dariga 
Nazarbaeva, daughter of Nazarbaev,13 and self-nominated candidates. In both cases, the 
authorities ignored calls to annul the elections, which the opposition insisted were 
manipulated and rigged. 
 Meanwhile, in the summer of 2000, pro-president parliamentary members 
proposed a Constitutional Law on the First President, which was successfully adopted in 
both chambers and subsequently signed by Nazarbaev himself in July of that year. 
Ostensibly drawn up to secure basic continuity in domestic as well as foreign policy, 
this law in fact provided Nazarbaev with political and material privileges after his 
retirement. Together with such prerogatives as initiating key policies on domestic issues 
and international and security concerns that would require consideration by government 
officials, the law guaranteed the First President a seat in the Constitutional Council and 
the Security Council as well as the chairmanship of the APK for life. The law also 
guaranteed immunity for the president and his property. 
Considering these developments, Nazarbaev’s overwhelming victory in the 
2005 December presidential election came as no surprise to observers at home and 
abroad. This enabled him to serve a third term as president (if his terms in Soviet times 
are not counted). The constitution ruled that one and the same person cannot be elected 
president more than twice in succession (Article 42.5). However, Nazarbaev was 
allowed to run for election by the logic that this constitutional article was to be applied 
only for the terms after the 1995 constitution. 
Following 2007 constitutional amendments that made substantial changes to 
the parliamentary system, early elections of the Mazhilis were held in August 2007, two?
years before its term expired. The most distinct change was abolishment of 
single-member constituencies and introduction of indirect election from within the APK 
in the Mazhilis, which we will discuss in detail in section 3. It is worth noting here that 
                                                                                                                                                  
assumed the post of Mazhilis deputy. 
12 The Agrarian Party (established in early 1999) advocated improvement of infrastructure in 
rural areas, tax reforms in the agrarian sector, and so forth. 
13 Asar was founded in October 2003. 
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Table 1  Parliamentary System of Kazakhstan, 1995-2007 
 Chambers Term Quorum Voting System 
December 
1995- 
September/
October 
1999 
Senat  
(the upper 
chamber) 
4 years  47 (half of 40 
seats elected 
every 2 years)
40 elected indirectly by maslikhats 
or provisional parliaments (2 each 
from 19 oblasts and Almaty)[1], 7 
nominated by the president 
Mazhilis 
(the lower 
chamber) 
4 years 67 All seats directly elected in 
single-member electoral districts 
September/
October 
1999- 
August 
2007 
Senat 6 years  39 (half of 32 
seats elected 
every 3 years)
32 seats elected indirectly by 
maslikhats (2 each from 14 oblasts, 
Astana and Almaty), 7 nominated 
by the president 
Mazhilis 5 years 77 67 seats directly elected in 
single-member electoral districts, 
10 seats chosen under the 
proportional representation system 
in a national electoral district by 
party lists [2] 
August 
2007- 
Senat 6 years  47 (half of 32 
seats elected 
every 3 years)
32 seats elected indirectly by 
maslikhats (2 each from 14 oblasts, 
Astana and Almaty), 15  
nominated by the president 
Mazhilis 5 years 107 98 seats directly elected under the 
proportional representation system 
in one national electoral district by 
party lists, 9 seats indirectly elected 
from within the Assembly of the 
People of Kazakhstan [3]   
Note 1: Due to the expiry of the two-year term for half of the Senat deputies, elections were held in 
October 1997. Because of oblast restructuring in the spring of that year, new senators were elected 
from fourteen oblasts and from the city of Almaty. Following the relocation of the capital in 
December 1997, two Senat deputies were elected from Akmola (present Astana) in February 1998. 
Note 2: The Election Law (revised in May 1999) stipulated that deputy mandates were to be 
distributed in strict accordance with the sequence of candidates in the party list (Article 97-1, 
Section 4). The June 2007 amendment to the Election Law gave party leadership more discretion 
in the distribution of gained seats. According to the revised article, the leading organ of the party 
decides who should be elected among candidates in the list arranged in alphabetical order. 
Note 3: In 2007, the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan was renamed the Assembly of the 
People of Kazakhstan. For details, see section 3. 
Sources: Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (http://www.parlam.kz); the Constitution and 
Election Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  
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this parliamentary reform was once again combined with amendments favouring 
Nazarbaev: he is now allowed to seek re-election as many times as he wants. Article 
42.5 of the constitution stipulating that one and the same person cannot be elected 
president more than twice in succession is accompanied by the wording: ‘this limitation 
is not applied to the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.’ The presidential 
term that had been extended to seven years in 1998 was again set at five years (Article 
41.1), but this five-year term will be applied to presidents elected after 2012, when the 
term of the incumbent president will expire. 
 
2 Political Parties 
In Kazakhstan, the end of the single-party dictatorship of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in March 1990 and the break-up of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan 
(CPK) in September 1991 did not lead to the emergence of ethnic parties. The Socialist 
Party, the legal successor to the CPC, practically avoided ethnic issues, and focused 
almost exclusively on economic and social problems (Melvin 1995: 111).14 
Re-established by a group of people who opposed the CPK’s reorganisation into the 
Socialist Party in the fall of 1991, the Communist Party enjoyed more support among 
Slavs than among Kazakhs.15 However, this has perhaps more to do with differences in 
age structure by ethnicity, not with ethnicity in itself; the Communist Party had strong 
supporters among pensioners, where Slavs predominated over Kazakhs. The People’s 
Congress Party, headed by Olzhas Suleimenov, leader of the anti-nuclear 
Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement that enjoyed nationwide support during the 
perestroika era,16 was not nationalist either (Schatz 1999). Suleimenov defended 
Kazakh culture and traditions, but he himself wrote poetry in Russian, and he attached 
great importance to the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and considered 
himself a ‘Eurasianist’ (Aiaganov and Kuandykov 1994: 6-7). 
                                                  
14 See Babakumarov (1994: 17-19) for the programme of the Socialist Party. 
15 According to sociological research conducted by the Information Centre of the Supreme 
Soviet in 1994, more than fifty percent of party supporters were Russians, while 22.7 percent 
were Kazakhs, and 13.6 percent were Ukrainians (Babakumarov et al. 1995: 59). 
16 The People’s Congress Party was born on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
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 Ethnic parties or movements never became influential in parliament. Before 
ethnically based parties were banned (see below), a Kazakh nationalist party Alash 
participated in the 1999 Mazhilis elections but failed to pass the seven percent threshold 
in a nationwide district elected by party-list (it did not participate in single-member 
constituencies). It should be noted, however, that the Slavic movement Lad achieved a 
certain success in the mid-1990s; in the 1994 Supreme Soviet elections Lad managed to 
send four of its members and eight closely linked candidates to the legislature (Melvin 
1995: 114). 
 Why are ethnic parties weak in Kazakhstan? In other words, why are all major 
parties—pro-regime or opposition—not based on ethnicity? Setting problems that exist 
within ethnic movements aside, let us consider here the strategy of the Nazarbaev 
administration to avoid the emergence of ethnic parties, or raising ethnic issues in 
general during election campaigns. There have been two means exploited for that 
purpose: one is the legal control imposed on ethnically based political organisations, 
and the other— the creation of catch-all parties that claim to represent the interests of all 
nationalities from above. 
 
Constitutional and Legal Restrictions 
Kazakhstan’s first Constitution, adopted in 1993, banned political parties based on 
religion (Article 58). While there was no article directly addressing ethnic parties, 
Article 55 prohibited the establishment and activities of public associations 
(obshchestvennye ob”edineniia) that proclaim or practise racial, ethnic, social, and 
religious intolerance. The 1995 Constitution inherited these principles; religious parties 
were banned (Article 5.4), and public associations kindling social, racial, ethnic, 
religious, class, or clan hostility were prohibited (Article 5.3). The 1996 Law on 
Political Parties had the same provisions that prohibited religious activities and 
instigation of ethnic antagonism (Article 5.6 and 5.7). But again, it did not ban 
explicitly ethnic parties themselves.  
 Here, a distinction between political parties and public associations needs to be 
drawn. According to Kazakhstan’s legal framework, political parties are considered a 
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sub-category of public associations. In the first years of independence, all public 
associations were regulated by the Law on Public Associations of the Kazakh Soviet 
Socialist Republic, passed in June 1991.17 In 1996, separate laws on political parties 
and on public associations were adopted, and both were allowed to take part in elections. 
It was only in April 2004 that the election law was amended to limit the right to 
nominate candidates for the Mazhilis to political parties (Article 87). In addition, 
political parties alone were entitled to participate in elections under the proportional 
representation system that was introduced in 1999.  
 The constitutional provision against kindling ethnic antagonism was effectively 
used to silence activists, among others, those who called for unification of the northern 
regions of Kazakhstan with Russia. Another popular means for controlling ethnic 
organisations was the Law on Public Associations, and other related legislation that 
regulates their activities. Public associations must register with the Ministry of Justice, 
and are obliged to submit a written application in advance to the local administration in 
order to hold public meetings and demonstrations. The authorities made frequent use of 
ethnically neutral provisions to pressure ethnic movements, by rejecting or annulling 
registration, and refusing permission for gatherings.  
 The abovementioned constitutional and legal regulations not only allowed the 
authorities to obstruct the activities of ethnic organisations, but also effectively forced 
movement leaders to curtail their activities. Any activities that the authorities considered 
ethnically extreme could be, based on the constitution, punished; any attempt to 
publicly put ethnic issues on the agenda could be labelled the instigation of ethnic 
hatred. The ban on the promotion of interethnic intolerance was in fact stretched to bar 
oppositional candidates from running in elections.18 Thus, activists were forced to 
exercise discretion so that they would not be accused of marring interethnic accord.  
 In July 2002, the newly adopted Law on Political Parties definitively banned 
                                                  
17 The only substantial difference was the conditions for registration with the Ministry of 
Justice. The Law on Public Associations obliged political parties to have three thousand 
members (Article 13), while no such hurdle was set for other public associations.  
18 For example, in the 2004 Mazhilis elections, two Uzbek candidates from electoral District 63 
(the South Kazakhstan oblast) were de-registered due to comments they made that allegedly 
incited ethnic hostility (OSCE/ODIHR 2004: 18).  
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ethnic parties.19 The law stipulated that the ‘establishment of political parties on the 
basis of professional, racial, national (natsional’naia), ethnic (etnicheskaia), and 
religious affiliation of citizens’ is not allowed (Article 5.8). Moreover, it prohibited 
political parties from indicating ethnic or religious characteristics, or using the names of 
historic figures in party names (Article 7.2). It also made it illegal to limit party 
membership according to professional, social, racial, tribal, ethnic, or religious 
affiliation (Article 8.6).  
 Indeed, on the eve of the adoption of the new Law on Political Parties, it was 
the tightening of conditions for registration,20 not the ban on ethnic parties that gave 
rise to the most heated debate. The 2002 Law stipulated that a political party should 
have a membership of no less than fifty thousand, and should establish branches in all 
of the fourteen oblasts (provinces) as well as Almaty and Astana, each branch with no 
less than seven hundred people (Article 10.6); no less than one thousand people 
representing two thirds of the fourteen oblasts, Almaty and Astana should call a 
founding conference (Article 6.1). At the same time, these clauses effectively prevented 
the emergence of political movements that would enjoy strong support from a particular 
region, which serves, in Kazakhstan’s ethno-demographic situation, as an indirect 
restraint on ethnically based parties. It should be noted here, however, that the majority 
of political parties in Kazakhstan did not have distinct regional orientations even before 
the tightening of requirements for party registration.21   
 
Catch-all Pro-presidential Parties 
As Cummings (2005: 104) has correctly noted, Nazarbaev created top-down catch-all 
parties such as the Party of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (PPU) and the Republican 
Political Party Otan (’Fatherland’ in Kazakh), to curtail ethnically based movements. 
The Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan, the predecessor to the PPU, was formed in 
                                                  
19 This move was obviously instigated by the registration of the Russian Party of Kazakhstan 
(Russkaia partiia Kazakhstana) in April 2002. For details, see Oka (2003: 480-482). 
20 The 1996 Law on Political Parties required holding a founding congress with no less than ten 
people (Article 6.1), and having no less than three thousand members who represent no less than 
half of all oblasts (Article 10.4). 
21 Some opposition parties enjoyed more support among the urban electorate. ?  
 12
the run-up to the March 1994 parliamentary elections and was reorganised into the party 
in February 1995.22 Its leadership included members of the Socialist Party, People’s 
Congress Party and high-ranking officials. Although not formally heading it himself,23 
President Nazarbaev demonstrated his support for the Union of People’s Unity by 
attending its first congress in October 1993 (Aiaganov and Kuandykov 1994: 5-6, 
Babakumarov 1994: 21-22). In the 1994 and 1995 parliamentary elections, the 
Union/Party of People’s Unity formed the strongest faction in the national legislature.24   
 During the electoral campaign for the 1999 January presidential elections, the 
PPU and other pro-government parties and movements established a new party Otan. At 
the first party congress held in March 1999, Nazarbaev was elected chairman of the 
party but soon resigned, and appointed Sergei Tereshchenko, former Prime Minister, as 
acting chairman.25 In the 1999 Mazhilis elections, Otan held one third (twenty four out 
of seventy seven in total) of the seats, while in 2004 it secured more than a half (forty 
two out of seventy seven) of the seats in the lower chamber of parliament. Having 
absorbed Asar, Civic and Agrarian Parties, and renamed itself Nur Otan in 2006, the 
party, now headed by Nazarbaev himself,26 gained all ninety eight directly elected seats 
in the 2007 Mazhilis elections. As Melvin (1995: 115-116) pointed out regarding the 
Union of People’s Unity, the creation and electoral success of these pro-presidential 
parties served to neutralise non-Kazakh political and economic elites who joined their 
ranks.  
 Naturally, the position of these presidential parties on the nationality question 
mirrored the official policy of the state.27 Both the PPU and (Nur) Otan advocated 
                                                  
22 PPU’s official registration with the Ministry of Justice was in March 1993. 
23 The 1993 Constitution stipulated that the president should not hold any post in public 
associations (Article 77).  
24 In the thirteenth Supreme Soviet, the faction of the Union of People’s Unity had thirteen 
deputies. In the 1995 Mazhilis elections, twenty four candidates (of them, twelve were party 
members) supported by the PPU were successfully elected. See Brif (2001).  
25 This was due to the constitutional provision that prohibited the participation of an incumbent 
president in political party activities (Article 43.2).  
26 Following the 2007 constitutional amendments that abolished Article 43.2, Nazarbaev 
officially assumed the chairmanship of Nur Otan in July 2007.  
27 For PPU’s programme, see Aiaganov and Kuandykov (1994). Otan’s party programme was 
downloaded at its website (http://www.party.kz/program.shtml [accessed in November 2005]). 
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interethnic accord, equality of all ethnic communities, and Kazakhstan patriotism based 
on citizenship, while acknowledging the special rights of Kazakhs for national 
self-determination on the territory of Kazakhstan. During the election campaigns, 
however, the pro-presidential parties downplayed this dualism and emphasised their 
transethnic character, claiming that they represented the interests of all ethnic groups.28  
 For the opposition, this official principle of ethnic equality was difficult to 
challenge. Analysing the programmes of the political parties that participated in the 
1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections, Kazakhstani scholars concluded that attitudes 
toward the nationalities question were practically identical across the parties, with the 
exception of the Kazakh nationalist party Alash (Kurganskaia and Sabit 2000; 
Kurganskaia 2005). General principles such as equality among ethnic groups, 
interethnic accord, and opposition to ethnic discrimination were mentioned in all the 
programmes, yet they failed to specify the means to be applied, for example, what laws 
should be adopted or what institutions should be established in order to achieve these 
goals.29 ‘All parties … limit themselves to outlining the ethnic problems and none has 
gone as far as suggesting specific ways and methods for their settlement’ (Kurganskaia 
2005: 78). This can be explained, as Kurganskaia rightly suggests, by the complicated 
nature of a problem that demanded detailed and substantial examination, and, perhaps 
more importantly, politicians’ fear of losing the support of a particular group or groups 
of the electorate by taking a definite position on the ethnic issue, a stance which almost 
inevitably means taking sides with one or another of competing ethnic communities. 
Generally, this holds true for political parties and movements (with the exception of 
nationalist ones) that functioned in the early years of independence (Kusherbaev 1996: 
Chapter 7, Aiaganov and Kuandykov 1994).30  
                                                  
28 Otan’s election posters included pictures of different nationalities, such as Kazakhs, Russians, 
Koreans and Uighurs, with comments on why they support Otan. Author’s observation in 
Almaty, September 2004. 
29 Kurganskaia and Sabit (2000: 37) pointed out that the only exception was the Republican 
People’s Party whose programme referred to a Law on the Basis of Interethnic Relations, but no 
details of this proposed law were given. The Republican People’s Party was one of the 
opposition parties that took part in the 1999 elections (in single-member constituencies only; the 
party boycotted the election in a nationwide constituency of proportional representation). 
30 Kusherbaev (1996: 139) writes that the People’s Congress Party, the People’s Cooperative 
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3 Balancing Act from Above 
Domination of Kazakhstan’s parliament by ethnic Kazakhs has often been referred to as 
evidence of ethnicisation of power and discrimination against minorities. Table 2 shows 
the ethnic composition of the elected members of the parliament (after 1995, the lower 
chamber of the parliament, Mazhilis, only). As these figures clearly demonstrate, the 
share of ethnic Kazakh deputies in the legislature is considerably higher than that of the 
Kazakh population as a whole,31 and its percentage has been growing.  
 
Table 2  Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan’s Parliaments, 1990-2007 
 The Number of Seats Percentage of Total 
Elections Date Kazakhs Russians Others Total Kazakhs Russians Others 
April 1990[1] 193 127 31 351 55.0 36.2 8.8
March 1994 105 48 24 177 59.3 27.1 13.6
Dec. 1995[2] 42 19 6 67 62.7 28.3 9.0
October 1999 58 19 0 77 75.3 24.7 0.0
Sept./Oct. 2004 61 15 1 77 79.2   19.5 1.3
August 2007[3] 82(1) 17(1) 8(7) 107(9) 76.6 15.9 7.5
Note 1: Galiev et al. (1994) divide deputies into three groups: Kazakhs, Slavs, and others. Thus, the 
exact number of Russians is unknown. For convenience sake, the number of Slavs is indicated in 
place of Russians here. 
Note 2: ‘Others’ includes one deputy whose ethnic background is unknown. 
Note 3: The numbers in parentheses indicate those who were elected from within the Assembly of 
the People of Kazakhstan. 
Sources: Galiev et al., (1994: 49-50), Bremmer and Welt (1996: 190), Dave (1996: 37), Oka (2000: 
82-83), Nurmukhamedov and Chebotarev (2005), the website of the Parliament of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (http://www.parlam.kz), the website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(http://www.akorda.kz). 
 
As Kazakhstan’s central or regional election commissions do not publish data 
on the ethnic composition of each constituency, it is very difficult to analyse voting 
behaviour of the electorate by ethnicity. In addition, repeated criticisms of irregularities 
in vote counting meant that officially announced election results might not reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Party, communists, and socialists supported the idea of granting state language status to Russian, 
but there are no such references in their party programmes compiled in Aiaganov and 
Kuandykov (1994) (the programme of the People’s Cooperative Party is missing).    
31 The 1999 census registered the share of Kazakhs as 54.3 percent of the total population of 
the republic. According to the latest data, this figure increased to 59.2 percent (2007). 
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preferences of the voters correctly. These informational constraints preclude 
identification of the structural reasons for Kazakhs’ overrepresentation in the parliament. 
But evidence suggests that overrepresentation of Kazakhs is not necessarily a result of 
systematic discrimination against all non-Kazakhs. In fact, the ruling elite allowed loyal 
candidates of ethnic minorities to be successfully elected, while also barring others from 
running for the legislature. 
 
Nominating Russians 
Analysing the 1994 Supreme Soviet election results, Bremmer and Welt (1996: 
188-190) pointed out that President Nazarbaev used the state list (almost a quarter of 
seats were elected out of a list of candidates compiled by the president, see section 1) 
not only to increase his supporters' chances of gaining seats, but also to manipulate the 
legislature’s ethnic composition; in many cases, the state list was used to have at least 
one Russian elected from a Kazakh-dominated oblast and vice versa.32 It also made a 
point of listing representatives of non-Russian minorities who otherwise tended to be 
underrepresented.33 On this point, Melvin also argues that candidates on the list 
included a significant number of non-Kazakhs, whose subsequent election ‘provided a 
powerful counterweight to the emergence of independent settler [Russian-speaking] 
politicians’ (Melvin 1995: 116). Indeed, an analysis of the voting pattern of the deputies 
elected from the state list demonstrated that they did not expound the interests of the 
non-titulars any more than other deputies did. Instead, they tended to be more 
supportive of the nationalities policy of the government.34 
 Here, the ethnic backgrounds of candidates and winners of the 2004 Mazhilis 
elections are examined, using detailed information provided by Nurmukhamedov and 
Chebotarev (2005). According to this data, among those who won the election in 
                                                  
32 Forty two deputies elected based on the state list represented the then nineteen oblasts and 
two cities with republican status, Almaty and Leninsk. 
33 The ethnic composition of those elected among the party or self-nominated deputies and 
presidential nominees was as follows: Kazakhs—59.3 and 59.5 percent, Russians—29.0 and 
21.4 percent, and others—11.9 and 19.0 percent, respectively (Bremmer and Welt 1996: 190). 
34 This research was conducted by Nurbulat Masanov, a Kazakhstani political scientist. For 
details, see Kolstø (1998: 66). 
 16
single-member districts, Kazakhs comprised 79.1 percent, and Russians—20.9 percent. 
Among the candidates, the percentage of Kazakhs was 77.5, while Russians—16.1. 
Thus, the share of Kazakhs was already disproportionately high at the time of standing 
for parliament.35 In the 1994 elections, there were widespread accusations that Russian 
ethnic movements, among others, members of Lad, were arbitrarily denied registration 
(Bremmer and Welt 1996: 188), but ten years later these organisations were almost 
invisible in election campaigns, a phenomenon to which government control strategy 
has undoubtedly contributed. The Russian activist Fedor Miroglov (2005: 16) explains 
Russians’ passiveness towards the 2004 elections by their sceptical attitude and distrust 
of the state. If this view is correct, the Russian population may have become even more 
apathetic about politics in the course of a decade. Meanwhile, all other non-Kazakh 
candidates lost the election, as was also the case in 1999. 
 As mentioned above, in the 2004 Mazhilis elections all seats in single-member 
districts were won by pro-presidential parties and independent candidates. The fact that 
all Russian election winners belonged to pro-Nazarbaev parties suggests that their 
success greatly depended on their loyalty to the regime.36 At the level of oblasts, 
pro-regime parties obviously took the ethnic factor into consideration: in oblasts with a 
relatively high percentage of Russians, these parties actively put forward Russian 
candidates for the legislature.37 The election results also reflected the geographic 
diversity of ethnic distribution in Kazakhstan. In the regions with relatively large 
Russian populations, such as the North Kazakhstan oblast (49.8 percent in the 1999 
census), the city of Almaty (45.2 percent), and the East Kazakhstan oblast (45.4 
                                                  
35 Among those whose registration as a candidate for the elections was rejected, it did not 
appear that a particular ethnic background operated to one’s disadvantage. However, some 
individuals may have received unofficial pressure not to run for the elections at all.  
36 These included Otan, Asar, and AIST, an election block formed by the Civic Party and 
Agrarian Party.  
37 There is evidence that the opposition also demonstrated their sensibility to ethnic structure of 
the electorate. In the 2003 elections in Almaty city maslikhat, the opposition formed an 
interethnic election bloc Alma-Ata into Pure Hands! (internatsional’naia platforma Alma-Atu v 
chistye ruki!), whose candidates represented a variety of ethnic groups residing in Almaty. 
Interview with Petr Svoik, co-chairman of Azamat, 13 September 2003. This information was 
confirmed by two other informants who ran for the Almaty maslikhat election: Anatolii 
Kuzevanov, activist of Lad (23 September 2003) and Emma Iugai, a Korean candidate (25 
September 2003). 
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percent), the number of Russian winners exceeded that of Kazakhs. Conversely, in the 
oblasts and the city of Astana where all those who won electoral office were Kazakhs,38 
the Kazakh population comprised a clear majority of the population, with the sole 
exception of the capital Astana where ethnic Kazakhs did not form a majority.  
 
Minority Representation Institutionalised 
As shown above, we have indications suggesting that the president and ruling parties 
have been trying to maintain a certain ethnic balance in the parliament by nominating 
non-Kazakh, pro-regime candidates. In 2007, the representation of ethnic minorities was 
for the first time institutionalised through the Assembly of the People (originally 
‘Peoples’—see below) of Kazakhstan. 
The Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK, Assambleia narodov 
Kazakhstana), a presidential consultative body, is touted by the Kazakhstani regime as a 
good example of successful policy-making on the nationalities question. The APK was 
founded by presidential decree on 1 March 1995 in order to develop practical 
recommendations for ethnic consolidation, as well as to assist the president in his role as 
guarantor of the rights and freedom for all ethnic groups. By this decree, the primary 
tasks of the APK are to preserve interethnic accord and stability within the state; to 
develop proposals for conducting state policy in ways that foster friendly relations 
among the nationalities residing in the territory of Kazakhstan; and to assist in their 
spiritual and cultural revival and development based on equal rights. Seven years later, 
the Nazarbaev administration boasted that the tasks set before the APK at the period of 
its establishment had been ‘as a whole completed.’39 A new Regulation on the 
Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan approved in April 2002 suggested that the APK 
should now work for the formation of ‘the Kazakhstani identity’ (kazakhstanskaia 
identichnost’) by consolidating ethnic groups around the principle of Kazakhstani 
                                                  
38 The oblasts of Aktobe, Almaty, Atyrau, Zhambyl, Kyzylorda, Mangistau, and South 
Kazakhstan. In these oblasts, ethnic Kazakhs constituted between sixty and ninety percent of the 
total population.  
39 The Strategy of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan for the Middle Period (until 
2007), approved by Presidential Decree, 26 April 2002. 
 18
patriotism, and with ‘a pivotal role of the state [i.e. Kazakh] language and the culture of 
the Kazakh people.’  
 According to APK procedures, President Nazarbaev, APK’s chairperson, 
directly appoints two deputies and makes the final decision on who should be granted 
membership or excluded from the APK. The APK consists of representatives of the state 
organs, as well as various ethnic and other public associations. A full session of the APK 
is to be called no less than once a year, and a standing organ—the Council (Sovet) of the 
Assembly consisting of APK members conducts work between APK sessions. Its 
working organ is part of the presidential administration.40 In the regions, small 
assemblies (malye assamblei) are organised under the Akim (governor)’s chairmanship 
in each oblast, as well as in Almaty and the new capital Astana (since the relocation of 
the capital).  
Officially declared purposes and missions notwithstanding, the most important 
functions of the APK are supervising affiliated ethnic organisations and co-opting their 
leaders. It sought to depoliticise ethnic movements by closely observing their activities 
so that they would not overstep ‘safe’ boundaries, such as the teaching of and publishing 
in ethnic languages, holding cultural events like ethnic festivals and performances by 
dance troupes. At the same time, by providing a variety of incentives, the APK 
effectively co-opted activists of ethnic movements. Affiliated organisations of the APK 
as well as of small assemblies in the regions were often (if not always) provided with 
financial resources and office space. More importantly, through central and regional 
assemblies, their members could secure a direct route to appeal to the president and 
Akims. Thus, the APK functioned as a field for official as well as unofficial negotiations 
between the state and ethnic elites.41 Another important function was to afford 
individual ethnic elites a certain social status; in addition to the honourable orders that 
                                                  
40 Originally it was called the executive secretariat, later renamed simply the apparatus 
(apparat) in 2002. The original version of the presidential decree on the APK did not specify the 
state organ to which the executive secretariat belonged. The amendment made in April 1998 put 
the APK under the aegis of the Ministry of Information and Social Accord, but in October 2000 
it became part of the Presidential Administration. 
41 Issues discussed in such negotiations were not limited to purely linguistic or cultural matters; 
distribution of official posts appears to be one of the most important issues. 
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APK members were frequently awarded, the APK member title itself served to enhance 
an individual’s influence or political voice in community.42  
Not surprisingly, a large majority of leaders of the ethnic organisations under 
the APK were members of pro-presidential parties. During election campaigns, they 
demonstrated their loyalty to the regime by mobilising their respective communities in 
support of pro-regime candidates irrespective of ethnic background, rather than 
candidates of their ethnicity (Oka 2006: 236-237).  
From the time of its establishment, the APK, despite its being no more than a 
consultative organ under the president, has been used to create the image of all 
nationalities enjoying equal representation at the state level. As we have seen above, at 
its first session, in March 1995, the APK unanimously adopted a resolution to hold a 
referendum on extending the president’s term to December 2000. As the Supreme 
Soviet had been dissolved soon after Nazarbaev created the APK, the APK made this 
recommendation in the name of Kazakhstan’s people as if it were a substitute for the 
parliament. But it was the 2007 constitutional reforms that officially institutionalised the 
role of the APK in the legislature.  
The constitutional amendments of May 2007, proposed by Nazarbaev and 
approved two days later by the parliament, were allegedly made to strengthen the role of 
the parliament. The most distinct change came in the structure of the Mazhilis, the lower 
chamber of the parliament: the number of its deputies was increased from seventy seven 
to one hundred and seven; the sixty seven single-member constituencies were abolished, 
and instead, ninety eight (previously ten) seats were chosen under the proportional 
representation system, and nine were elected directly from within the APK (Article 
51.1). Furthermore, the president nominated fifteen upper chamber deputies, rather than 
seven as had previously been the case, ‘considering the necessity to secure 
representation of national-cultural and other significant interests of society in the Senat’ 
(Article 50.2).43  
                                                  
42 Several leaders of ethnic organisations interviewed by the author mentioned this point.  
43 The 1995 Constitution established the two-chamber parliament and gave the president the 
right to nominate seven members of the upper house. During the parliamentary elections held in 
the same year, the head of the Central Electoral Commission justified this nomination system by 
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 Following this reform, the president dissolved the Mazhilis in June 2007 and 
called for early elections on 18 August. These elections resulted in an overwhelming 
victory for the presidential Nur Otan party, which won nearly ninety percent of the vote 
and gained all ninety eight directly elected seats, leaving no seats for other parties. The 
elections from within the APK, held separately on 20 August, were a de facto vote of 
confidence as the APK had nominated only nine candidates, the exact number to be 
chosen from the Assembly.44 Undoubtedly, the deputies representing the APK 
contributed to diversification of the ethnic composition of the Mazhilis; the number of 
ethnic groups represented in the lower chamber increased from three to nine.45 Yet the 
lower house was dominated by ethnic Kazakhs, and the number of Russian deputies 
continued to decline (see Table 2). 
 On 29 August, Nazarbaev appointed eight senators to fill the newly added seats 
to be nominated by the president. As discussed above, the enlargement of the number of 
presidential appointees was justified by the necessity to secure the representation of a 
variety of social groups. However, the introduction of the eight new members did not 
have a significant impact on ethnic representation in the upper house; except for Iurii 
Tskhai, President of the Association of the Koreans in Kazakhstan, and a deputy of 
Slavic origin, it appears that all other deputies had Kazakh family names.  
Thus, under the pretext of institutionalising ethnic representation in the 
parliament, President Nazarbaev in fact increased the number of deputies whom he 
could appoint. Though representing their respective ethnic communities, deputies from 
the APK were, as fifteen senators nominated by the president, also presidential 
appointees, and this combination served to strengthen the influence of Nazarbaev—the 
APK chairman for life with the authority to appoint its members, in the legislature. In 
other words, ethnic representation was institutionalised at the expense of democracy in 
                                                                                                                                                  
the necessity to ensure representation of ethnic and other group interests (Kolstø 2004: 172). 
The 2007 constitutional amendments made specific reference to this idea for the first time.  
44 Ethnic backgrounds of those elected were as follows: Balkar, Belorusian, German, Kazakh, 
Korean, Russian, Uighur, Ukrainian, and Uzbek. The elected Uzbek deputy was Rozakul 
Khalmuradov, Chairman of the Republican Association of Social Unions of Uzbeks Dostlik. 
45 Successful candidates chosen by proportional representation included a German candidate, 
who was the sole non-Russian, non-Kazakh elected deputy. 
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Kazakhstan. 
 Meanwhile, the 2007 constitutional reforms brought another change to the 
Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan; it is called the Assembly of the People of 
Kazakhstan (Assambleia naroda Kazakhstana).46 APK Deputy Chairman Sergei 
Diachenko explained the reason for using ‘people’ in the singular as follows: ‘In these 
years [since the APK was founded in 1995] we have indeed transformed into the people 
of Kazakhstan.’47 What is stressed here is not assimilation of non-Kazakhs into the 
Kazakh nation, but the formation of a multiethnic Kazakhstani people whose members 
identify themselves with the Republic of Kazakhstan irrespective of their ethnic 
background. In the sixteen years since independence, it indeed seems that a sense of 
Kazakhstani identity has been growing. However, the new title for the Assembly does 
not suggest that such an identity has been fully established—after all, identity building 
is a long-term process and it is difficult to tell when the process has been completed. 
Rather, by applying the singular ‘people’ the government seeks to boast that President 
Nazarbaev has successfully integrated a variety of ethnic groups into a civic 
Kazakhstani nation.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper demonstrated how the Nazarbaev administration has carefully de-ethnicised 
elections through restrictive measures as well as co-optation. The arbitrary use of 
constitutional and legal provisions (and the self-restraint exercised by candidates who 
were afraid of being accused of inciting ethnic hatred) considerably limited participation 
in elections by ethnic organisations and leaders. In 2002, ethnic parties were themselves 
banned. In seeking to avoid ethnic voting, however, these oppressive methods were 
combined with the formation of powerful pro-president parties that exhibited a 
cross-ethnic character. The control strategy in elections aimed not simply at ethnicising 
the parliament in favour of Kazakhs, but at having loyal Russians and other minorities 
                                                  
46 As a result of the 2007 amendments, the Constitution for the first time specified the status of 
the APK.  
47 Programma ‘Betpe Bet,’ 24 May 2007, Khabar, www.khabar.kz [accessed in June 2007].  
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represented. Although the parliamentary seats have been increasingly occupied by 
Kazakhs, Non-Kazakhs managed to secure a certain level of representation in the 
legislature by joining catch-all pro-regime parties, winning the personal support of the 
president, or through the presidential consultative body—Assembly of the People of 
Kazakhstan. As a result, during parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, ethnic issues 
were rarely addressed. Instead, election campaigns served as a stage on which 
cross-ethnic support for Nazarbaev was played out.  
 This well-controlled representation of minorities serves not only to placate 
non-Kazakhs without undermining the regime, but also to provide legitimacy for the 
Kazakh-dominated leadership by projecting the image of some degree of power-sharing. 
The Nazarbaev administration has increasingly used the notion of a Kazakhstan model 
of interethnic relations as the basis for legitimacy in the international system. The 
political leadership of the republic has shown enormous enthusiasm for advertising the 
successful cross-ethnic consolidation and unified support for the president. For 
Kazakhstan, interethnic accord has almost become a quasi state ideology. The Palace of 
Peace and Accord, a sixty two-meter-high pyramid-like building completed in the fall of 
2006 in front of the presidential residence in Astana, symbolises Nazarbaev’s ambitions 
to be a globally recognised leader who has made great contributions to the peaceful 
co-existence of peoples with different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. 
Kazakhstan has made much of this ‘model’ in its bid for the rotating chairmanship of 
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). While failing to 
fulfil its commitment to individual liberties and free and fair elections, Astana tried to 
appease the OSCE by demonstrating that Kazakhstan satisfies its criteria over the issue 
of minority protections. In November 2007, Kazakhstan was successfully elected to 
chair this organisation in 2010. It remains to be seen whether President Nazarbaev 
carries out political reforms to live up to its chairmanship of the OSCE, or consider that 
international community approved his policy and continues to concentrate power in his 
own hands. 
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